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For each island the external shocks together with the performance response to them are computed. It is noted that some resorted inordinately to external financing when faced with adverse shocks. Others sought to compensate by stimulating exports and tourism. The buildup of debt created problems for some of the governments later in the decade and resulted in the need for strong contractionary measures. However the difference in performance between islands cannot be explained by external shocks alone.
In a broader context it seems that the OECS group did achieve a superior performance even though they were faced by roughly similar shocks to the other group. This was helped by having a monetary board which was conducive to high investment levels. However this was complemented by concessionary flows used in a productive manner and by foreign direct investments.
I. INTRODUCTION

1.
The Caribbean area is composed of a number of relatively small islands with similar characteristics but also a remarkable range of diversity in terms of their socio-political arrangements, resource endowments and economic structures. Domestic markets are small and most islands are not well endowed with resources-Trinidad is the only oil exporter in the group. Generally export bases have been narrow and heavily dependent on a few commodities such as sugar, bananas, nutmeg, bauxite. Most of the islands have relied on preferential trade arrangements for their main exports. This access has certain advantages but it has also helped foster a level of competition in a number of industries below what might have resulted in a more open market situation. Historically there has always been a certain amount of tourism in the area and more recently most of the islands have sought to expand in this area and also diversify into other service industries.
2. This paper considers the performance of 10 of these islands divided into 2 groups over the period 1980-1992. Selected economic characteristics are presented in Tables 1 and 2 . The first group, hereafter called OECS 1 , is composed of six small islands, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St.
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 2 The second group aggregates four bigger islands, Barbados, Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. 3 All these countries, except Dominican Republic, are part of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). 4 To a casual observer the OECS countries in the period under analysis achieved far superior growth rates to most of the countries in the second group. The question is why? Were they particularly lucky in the external environment or was it their domestic policy or institutional arrangements? This is particularly important for providing access to new technology and ideas together with access to larger markets. As the economies become increasingly open they stand to gain from the opportunities in the global market but at the same time they become more exposed to the variability of the external world.
At this juncture global trading arrangements such as the completion of the Uruguay Round and NAFTA are introducing major challenges for policy-makers in this area. OECS countries in particular, given the uncertainty of the new banana regime in the European Union, are going to be less protected from changes in the world economy. 6 4.
The external environment plays an extremely important role in determining the economic progress, or lack thereof, throughout this area. Historically, the Caribbean economies have been exposed to a variety of external shocks. In recent years there has been an increasing tendency towards globalization of trade, services and capital flows. This has brought into sharper focus the issue of external shocks and how to deal with them. Generally when shocks are unfavorable, authorities in these countries treated them as temporary in the sense that they relied often heavily on external financing but when shocks turned favorable they did not seek to reduce external indebtedness.
5.
In doing this analysis one is limited by available data sources. Given the size of some of these countries it is inevitable that the resources available for gathering data is somewhat limited so it is important to bear this caveat in mind. In the following section an analysis of the main external shocks is presented while Section III discusses the responses to them. The main purpose of such study is to offer some insights on explaining how these economies fared, and may be useful for analysis in the future on how to deal with these problems.
5
Some of the OECS institutional characteristics are presented in Appendix 1.
6
The cost and the inefficiency of the new European Union's banana scheme are analyzed in Borrell (1994) . 6 . Section IV provides a brief overview of economic performances during the period 1980-92. It considers investment, savings, inflation, exchange rate, and the role of external resources.
An interesting point is that the OECS countries have a monetary board so one is tempted to draw some conclusions as to whether this played a pivotal role in their seemingly better growth performance during this period. Section V provides some insight on this issue. However, there are other considerations that seem to have been relevant such as access to concessionary finance and the level of investment. Further details are given on a country by country basis in Appendix 1.
II. EXTERNAL SHOCKS
7.
There is an extensive literature on whether open economies are better at handling the impact of external shocks. Balassa (1981) argued that openness to trade was positively related to economic performance. Sachs (1985) compared the economic performance of newly industrializing countries in East Asia and the economies of Latin America when faced with similar shocks. He argued that the superior performance of the former was due to greater export orientation but he also emphasized the role of a political culture more in tune with maintaining competitiveness. More recently Edwards (1993) in his study of Latin American countries investigated the interaction between trade, policy and productivity growth. He found that countries that were more open to the rest of the world have experienced faster growth in total productivity than countries with high trade barriers. Thus while most of the islands have reduced distortions and moved towards freer trading regimes the overall economic performance has not shown a uniformly dramatic improvement. Some of the explanation for this may be found in analyzing the external shocks they experienced and in particular the performance response to them.
8.
The analytical approach adopted in this paper is an extension of some earlier work by Balassa and more recently by McCarthy, Neary, Zanalda (1994) . The basis of this approach is to construct a counterfactual which seeks to generate what may be construed as normal for the external environment. In this analysis, based on the methodology presented in Appendix 2, the impact of the external environment is assessed by considering four direct and one indirect shocks. These are measured by the terms of trade effect, nonfactor services effect, export volume effect and the international interest rate effect. The indirect shock is the cumulative impact of net external borrowing resulting from the policies adopted in response to previous shocks. While the four direct shocks are exogenous, the cumulative impact of net external borrowing is due in part to the policies adopted in reaction to previous shocks. Fluctuations in each of these typically affect GNP growth, and the current account in particular, and so lead to changes in economic welfare. Other shocks, which also had an impact on GDP and welfare, such as the various hurricanes which devastated the Caribbean at the end of the seventies and in the eighties are not explicitly measured.
9.
While the general character of the external shocks may be similar, each country involves a distinct set of economic, socio-political and institutional features so that it is essential to consider countries on an individual basis. All countries except Trinidad and Tobago are oil importers and so were vulnerable to the oil shocks of the seventies. Trinidad, being an oil exporter, benefited from these prices increases. There were also significant swings in commodity prices, both favorable and unfavorable, where volatility posed a further challenge for policy-makers trying to steer a prudent course. Most islands were also severely impacted by changes in interest rates as they went from negative real levels in the seventies to over 10 percent in the early eighties. Others, such as Jamaica, were adversely affected by the US dollar depreciation during this period. Shocks, together with standard deviations (a measure of volatility) are shown in Table 3 . The individual country details are given in Appendix 1. It is noted that the OECS group typically suffered more severe shocks than the countries in the non-OECS sample except for Jamaica.
Yet the OECS group did better during this period in terms of growth rates. Table 5 shows the comparative growth performances in the two sets of countries in the period 1980-92. OECS countries experienced average real growth rates above 5 percent with the exception of Grenada (3.6 percent), well above the rates recorded by countries in the second group. In order to seek an answer the performance responses of these countries are first examined. However, rigid labor markets in many of the islands here considered would tend to reduce the effectiveness of incomes policy.
III. PERFORMANCE MEASURES
11.
Summary statistics of the performance measures of these countries is given in Table 4 .
Again individual country details are given in the Appendix 1. Even these broad patterns suggest significant differences in responses.
12.
OECS. In terms of export expansion the OECS group was far more successful throughout the period and especially during the first half. This was mainly driven by the recovery in the production of the main export crops after a temporary collapse caused by natural disasters. One also notes the OECS group tended to increase their imports per unit of output, as reflected in the negative import intensity measures, during the first sub-period. The negative economic compression measures indicate that output expansion had been quite substantial in four of the OECS countries in the period 1980-86. The main picture which emerges from these performance measures is that both exports and imports grew over the entire period and that the expansion in imports was partially explained by output growth. Large investments in infrastructure boosted demand for imports, particularly in the period 1983-89. Exports expanded over the period, and countries, except St. Vincent, used additional net external financing (ANEF) to partially offset the impact of adverse shocks.
13.
Barbados during the first sub-period achieved some export expansion and did resort to modest levels of additional net external financing. This was accompanied by some economic compression and increased import intensity. During the second sub-period the pattern was quite different. While there was some further economic compression, export expansion efforts faltered, import substitution increased and there was a decline in net additional external financing.
14.
Jamaica on the other hand suffered the largest shock among the non-OECS group and took a different tack. During the first sub-period it primarily resorted to additional external borrowing and actually retrogressed on export expansion. This set the stage for an even poorer performance during the second sub-period. The situation was further compounded by the structure of the Jamaican debt. It contained a basket of currencies so that US dollar service repayments increased substantially when that currency depreciated during the eighties against the yen and D-mark.
15.
Dominican Republic also relied on increased additional net external borrowing during the first sub-period and advanced little on export expansion. During the second sub-period it relied even more on ANEF and allowed its export expansion efforts to deteriorate even further.
16.
Trinidad and Tobago was the only oil exporter among all the countries considered in this analysis. During the first sub-period it increased its ANEF and allowed its export share to deteriorate.
During the second sub-period when oil prices fell, its export position continued to deteriorate and imports were not compressed so that it had to resort again to ANEF. This in turn resulted in a more difficult economic situation than at the beginning of the period as most of the problems like poor competitiveness and high unemployment still remained and now, in addition, Trinidad has a much higher external debt.
17.
Thus the broad pattern that emerges is that the OECS group seems to have done much better than the non-OECS group. Each group seems to have resorted to ANEF during the period. The OECS group seems to have moved towards a more import intensive growth pattern and also seems to have done better on export expansion. We now consider some of the underlying economic performance measures to throw some light on this.
IV. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE MEASURES
18.
A number of economic performance measures are given in Table 5 . These give some indication of the policies pursued. The table includes some of the typical flow variables but also includes some measures of debt and also of social progress. Ideally one would also like to include information on the environment in order to make an overall assessment of the sustainability of the strategy followed but this was not available to us at this time.
19.
Growth. The OECS countries recorded higher output growth than the larger economies over the period here considered. This disparity is even more evident in terms of GNP per capita growth.
While the OECS countries achieved annual growth rates around 5 percent, Trinidad and Dominican
Republic with negative growth rate were the worst performers. Jamaica and Barbados attained real per capita growth rates of 0.2 and 1 percent respectively. It is important to notice that the OECS economies started the 1980s from a lower base than the other economies here considered. At the sectoral level (see Table 2 ) one notes that the OECS group was particularly successful in the tourism and service sector but also achieved good growth rates in manufacturing.
20.
Inflation and REER. The OECS group had a good record on inflation while Barbados was the best performer among the non-OECS group. It is notable that the OECS group had currency board arrangement and that the Barbados dollar is pegged to the US dollar which no doubt helped.
Historically, this kind of arrangement has been very effective in keeping inflation under control, in particular in small countries such as the OECS islands, extremely sensitive to changes in the world inflation. 7 Both groups of countries started the decade of the eighties with annual rates of inflation above 15 and then followed different paths: the OECS islands and Barbados managed to keep the annual rate of inflation below 8 percent, while Jamaica and Dominican Republic recorded rates above 20 percent.
Volatility of the inflation rate at around 20 percent for the period 1980-92 was another source of instability in the economy of these two countries. This is also reflected in the high variability of the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER), Table 5 and Figure 1 . These two wrought a significant depreciation. All other countries in this sample had modest appreciation on average over the period. The OECS currency, the Eastern Caribbean dollar, has been pegged to the US dollar since 1976 and much of the fluctuation in the REER reflects changes in the external value of the US dollar. Trinidad, whose performance was different from all other islands, managed to reduce its annual rate of inflation from 13 percent in the period 1980-86 to 8 percent in the period 1987-92 and to restore the REER at its 1980 level after a strong appreciation in the middle of the decade.
21.
Investment-Savings.
Here again one notes striking differences between the two groups with the OECS islands having average investment ratios above the 30 percent level while the corresponding value for the non-OECS group was around 20 percent (see Table 5 ). The OECS group also had public investment shares above 10 percent of GDP or about double the level of the non-OECS group. Within the OECS group, St. Kitts, St. Lucia and St. Vincent have maintained high levels of public savings to partially fund their investment programs. The financing patterns also differ widely. The OECS group relied on both foreign and national savings while among the non-OECS group, Dominican Republic and Jamaica had significant external foreign financing but not nearly as much as the OECS group. Thus one notes that the OECS group had much higher investment shares. In Antigua, Dominica and Grenada these were financed primarily by external sources and in the other three by an almost equal proportion of domestic and external sources. Given the high unit costs of infrastructure and the high number of emergency investments, it is difficult to assess the profitability of investment in the OECS countries. The
ICORs are somewhat unstable and not particularly informative. However, data do suggest that the high 7 However, Hanke, Jonung and Schuler (1993) suggest that a currency board would be appropriate also for large economies that have a history of high inflation. investment shares in the OECS were associated with strong growth performance which supports the view that investment in these countries was reasonably effective.
22.
Debt and Debt Service. The debt to GNP ratio increased in all countries in the sample over the period 1980-92 (Table 5) . St. Kitts, St. Lucia and St. Vincent in the OECS group had only modest increases of 10 percent or less. These three also enjoyed the lowest interest to debt payment ratio. At the other end of the spectrum is Jamaica whose debt/GDP ratio increased by 78 percent over the period. It is notable that all of the OECS countries but Antigua had interest/debt ratios less than anyone of the non-OECS group. 8 However it seems that the financing of this investment highlights crucial differences.
While the OECS countries did increase net external borrowing the terms seem to have been particularly favorable. Thus the interest rate burden for the OECS group was less than their average growth rate. For the non-OECS group, on the other hand, the interest burden/debt ratio was higher than their average growth rate so that it became inevitable that their approach to economic growth was not sustainable even within a narrow economic definition. This difference is also confirmed by the larger portion of concessional debt as a share of total debt (see Figure 2 ) contracted by the OECS countries, again with the exception of Antigua.
23.
Social Variables. Over a relatively short period of 12 years it is difficult to assess the progress or lack thereof in most countries. The 1992 Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations suggests that the OECS group and the four other countries compare favorably with other middleincome developing countries. Barbados and Trinidad rank respectively 20th and 35th in the "high human" development group. All others are in the "medium human" development cohort. Life expectancy and infant mortality rates have improved in all countries. Public expenditure on education as a percent of GNP was on average around 5 percent for the entire sample in the period 1980-88. 8 Presently, Antigua is not considered creditworthy for IBRD lending. The country has heavily relied on commercial loans with short-term maturities, and cumulated arrears over the period under analysis.
V. ANALYSIS
24.
A number of regression estimates were made to try to clarify some of the relations discussed in the previous sections. Results of the estimated equations for the period 1980-92 with investment (gross domestic investment) as the dependent variable are reported in Table 6 and with real GDP growth as the dependent variable in Table 7 .
25. Investments (GDI) were regressed on the flow of Official Development Assistance (ODA), change in inflation (INFL), public sector balance (PSBALA), terms of trade shocks (TOT), black market premium (BMP) and foreign direct investments (FDI) for the period 1980-92. A dummy variable (OECSDUM) was introduced to separate the OECS countries from the other group. The results show that external financing through ODA and FDI, both significant, exerted a positive impact on GDI while inflation, albeit negative, and terms of trade shocks were not significant. In equations C and D the coefficients for black market premium and public sector balance were both significantly negative. A possible explanation of the latter result is that an increase in the public sector surplus or a reduction in the deficit depresses investments, at least in the short run. In equation D with the introduction of the OECS dummy variable, the coefficient of inflation becomes significant at the 10 percent level and positive. One interpretation of this result is that investment decisions are not affected by low levels of inflation as those experienced by the OECS countries during the period under analysis (see Figure 1 ). Other studies such as Cardoso and Fishlow (1990) , Little and al. (1994) , Bruno and Easterly (1994) show that only relatively high inflation inhibits growth. Equation D also indicates that presence in the OECS group, picked up by the dummy variable has an economically and statistically positive influence. Since the OECS group members have currency board arrangements, advocates of currency boards such as Hanke (1994) would certainly support the view that currency boards are good for reducing uncertainty, increasing confidence and so lead to improved investment performance. While the present evidence supports this view, it is not clear to what extent other variables also played a role.
26.
The results for GDP growth are presented in Table 7 . In the first four equations (E, F, G, H) growth was regressed on GDI, ODA, INFL, TOT, PSBALA and alternatively on government consumption (PUBCONS) and public savings (PUBSAV). Again, a dummy variable (OECSDUM) was introduced to separate the OECS from the non-OECS countries. In general the investment ratio (GDI) was always significant and it has also typically a coefficient of about 0.15 which is similar to results obtained by other researchers for other countries. The terms of trade shock (TOT) coefficient is negative but insignificant. This is probably because countervailing action is taken to offset its effect. Thus the effect of external shocks will often show up in increased debt ratios or reduced expenditures in public sector areas such as for health and education. However, estimates for the two periods 1980-86 and 1987-92, not shown in Table 7 , suggest that the volatility of the terms of trade shocks, measured by the standard deviation of the terms of trade shocks over the period considered, did exert a significant and negative influence on growth. This is presumably because it introduces a degree of uncertainty into investment decisions. Similar results were achieved adding a variable representing the real effective exchange rate volatility.
27.
The ODA and inflation coefficients were both significant at the 1 percent level in equations E, G and H (at the 5 percent level in equation F) with the expected signs suggesting that high levels of official aid from multilateral and bilateral donors enhanced economic growth. Substituting ODA with the stock of concessional debt variable (concessional debt as a share of total external debt) did not change these results significantly. PSBALA, PUBCONS and PUBSAV were used as a proxy for fiscal policy. In all equations they were statistically significant. While improvements in public sector balances and public savings seemed to have had a positive impact on growth, government consumption had the opposite effect. This supports the common observation that sound economic fiscal management engendered successful economic performances. The positive and significant coefficient of the dummy variable in equation F suggests that other characteristics peculiar to OECS countries might explain their higher growth.
28.
The results of the last four equations reported in Table 7 point out that the openness to international trade, measured by exports to GDP ratio, and tourism, measured by the rate of growth in tourist arrivals, also had a positive and highly significant relationship to real GDP growth. The explanatory power of tourism and public savings is enhanced by the introduction of the OECS dummy.
29.
In summary the results show that investment-GDP share is positively correlated with whether the island is in the OECS group and to the availability of external financing. Growth is positively related to investment-GDP share, availability of concessional external financing, and sound fiscal management. On the contrary it is negatively related to inflation, terms of trade shocks variability and real effective exchange rate volatility.
VI. CONCLUSION
30.
Countries in the Caribbean area have been relatively open. This has meant that they have been subject to a variety of external shocks especially due to terms of trade effects and changes in the external demand for their exports. The response to these shocks has varied significantly so that the economic performance has been quite different between countries. The OECS group in particular has achieved quite impressive growth rates while the non-OECS group considered in this paper has not been so fortunate. Both groups achieved some progress on a number of social measures but also increased their external indebtedness over the period. The question then is why did the OECS group do better. It seems that this group was able to achieve significantly higher growth rates based on higher investment rates. The OECS group also had monetary board arrangements which may have been supportive of greater confidence in the policy regime, in keeping inflation under control, and in maintaining fiscal discipline. 9 One of the findings of this paper is that part of the success of this group was due to the corresponding interest burden/debt ratios. For the OECS group it was less than the average GDP growth rate which contrasts sharply with the non-OECS group where the opposite was true. 10 Thus access to concessional lending, if it is channeled into productive investment, seems to be a key element in the strong economic performance of the OECS group.
9
On the effectiveness of currency board in promoting growth in developing countries see Hanke and Schuler (1994) . 10 An interesting evaluation of a country's debt sustainability can be found in Cohen (1985) and (1988).
31.
There is of course an obverse side to this analysis. If the OECS countries are to continue their strong economic growth performance then they will need to maintain high investment shares and ensure that this is used productively. In order to do this they will need either continuing access to concessionary financing or increasing their share of domestic savings or attracting more direct investments. As concessionary flows become less available globally, these economies will need to persevere in their policies to ensure continuing donors' support and foreign investors' interest. However,
given the high exposure to changes both in the economic and climatic external environment it would be desirable to continue supporting countries who are undertaking serious reforms to restructure their economy.
APPENDIX 1
This appendix provides, in the first section, a brief overview of the external environment faced by the OECS countries. In the second section, shocks, performance response measures and selected economic variables for each country included in this study are described. Each description is accompanied by a table which provides annual data on external shocks, policy performance measures and selected economic variables. This analysis greatly benefited from the work of Worrel (1987), Harker (1992) and World Bank reports.
shocks occurred after hurricane Hugo had damaged agricultural crops and infrastructure. The slowdown in the US and Europe in the first years of the 1990s represented another blow to these economies.
High real interest rates in international financial markets in the 1980s imposed severe foreign exchange losses on countries which had borrowed heavily abroad in their efforts to balance external receipts and payments during the 1970s. Given the high portion of concessional debt over total external debt, the OECS countries did not suffer as much as other countries in the Caribbean region and in Latin America.
It is commonly accepted that these islands were able to navigate through the unstable external environment of the 1980s by expanding tourism, which is at present the most important source of foreign exchange, and by exporting agricultural products, particularly bananas and sugar, under preferential market agreements to the European Union. However, the country by country analysis shows that other factors contributed to the positive overall performance of these small open economies.
One of the most important institutional arrangements of these islands is the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB), which replaced the East Caribbean Currency Authority in 1983. The main objectives of the ECCB are the maintenance of the international value of the Eastern Caribbean dollar, fixed since 1976 at EC$2.7 to US$1, and the promotion of monetary stability. Any change in the exchange rate of the Eastern Caribbean dollar requires unanimous agreement of all member states. The ECCB has worked well in the past and has succeeded in keeping foreign exchange cover well above the required 60 percent of its liabilities (currency and other demand liabilities). Credit to member governments, and therefore credit expansion, has been circumscribed within tight limits.
Antigua and Barbuda
Shocks. Antigua experienced adverse shocks at the beginning of the 1980s and after
1986 (see Table 8 ). These were mainly determined by unfavorable terms of trade shocks. However, while the shocks in the second half of the decade are explained by adverse movements in export and import prices, the 1981 shock was due to a constraint in the capacity to export and to the difficulty in cutting imports. Indeed, the economy was recovering from the devastation created by Hurricane David in 1979, and therefore it was not able to take advantage of the favorable terms of trade movement.
Overall, the adverse shocks in the decade have been offset by gains in the nonfactor services. Nonfactor receipts accounted for almost 50 percent of GDP in 1980 and 96 percent in 1990, which is the highest share among Caribbean countries (World Bank 1994a, p. 11) . The other main source of unfavorable shocks is the additional debt service. On average it has been above 1 percent of GDP throughout the period and it is explained by the reliance on external borrowing which accelerated in 1987. Antigua, among OECS countries, has the highest outstanding external debt (total debt was 73 percent of GNP in 1992) and the worst composition. The stock of external arrears is about 50 percent of GDP and most of the debt, primarily short-term, is owed to commercial banks. Private and official capital flows more than compensated for the current account deficits.
Responses
Remittances from Dominicans migrated to the United Kingdom, United States and Canada have steadily grown throughout the entire period under analysis. Moreover, after 1979, a sharp increase in remittances took place in response to a boom in the construction sector to repair damage caused by Hurricane Hugo in neighboring countries.
The external debt, mainly concessional, doubled from 23 percent of the GNP in 1980 to 50 percent in 1992. Given the high dependency on banana exports and a large public sector deficit (negative 14 percent of GDP in 1992), Dominica is particularly exposed to future shocks.
Grenada
Shocks. The terms of trade shocks at the beginning of the 1980s wiped out earlier terms of trade gains and caused a large balance of payments deficit in 1981. Terms of trade movements were the principal evidence of the effects of world economic fluctuations during the period under analysis. In 1986 the country was able to take advantage of the contemporary increase in banana prices and decline in oil prices. Unfortunately, this gain was more than wiped out in the following years. Furthermore, nutmeg and mace exports, the country's major export crops, dropped with the collapse of a marketing arrangement with Indonesia. Tourism became an important source of revenues in the 1990s with the increase of cruise ship visitors.
Stable growth averaging at around 5 percent was maintained during the period 1984-90, and then slowed again to about 1.5 percent as the adverse effects of the recession in the developed countries and the decline in agricultural sector were compounded by poor fiscal management.
Responses. The negative import intensity (-3 percent) trend in the first period was reversed in the following years (4 percent in 1987-92) . Both import intensity and export expansion measures were extremely volatile (see Table 10 ). 
St. Kitts and Nevis
Shocks. The country's economic performances followed closely the trends in the production and prices for sugar, which continues to be the most important economic activity. Responses. The diversification of the economy played a crucial role in helping St. Kitts to navigate through the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. In the 1980s St. Kitts recorded the highest growth rate (7.3 percent) in the tourism and services sector among all the countries considered in this study (see Table 2 ) while the agriculture sector declined by 2. Real GDP increased at an average annual rate of 5.8 percent in the period 1980-92.
In 1992 the banana industry contributed about 48 percent of merchandise export earnings and employed two-thirds of all agricultural workers, still the single most important economic activity in St.
Vincent and the Grenadines. Therefore, these islands are highly vulnerable to external shocks caused by weather conditions and by the removal of preferential agreements.
Responses. Export expansion gains in the 1980s, together with increased revenues from tourism, seem to have offset the negative impacts of external shocks, and financed the increase in imports up to 1988 (import intensity was positive in the period 1989-92). The fall in imports after 1988 is explained by the completion of several major public investment projects, the closure of certain industries, and decline in imports of inputs for the banana industry. High volume of ANEF, additional financing, was required to temper the impact of the largest shocks in 1980 and 1989. Since most of the external financing was represented by grants or concessional borrowing, the debt service has remained manageable. In the period 1980-92 the average level of GDI was around 30 percent of GDP, equally financed by national and foreign savings, particularly remittances. The majority of investments were channeled towards transport, communications, and construction sectors. Public finances have been managed prudently and most of the loss-making public enterprises have been privatized.
Most of St. Vincent external debt, 29 percent of GNP in 1992, is on concessional terms (see Figure 2) . The interest to debt ratio was at the relatively low level of around 3 percent at the beginning and the end of the period under analysis.
B. Barbados, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago.
Barbados
Barbados is in terms of size, geographical location and population very similar to the OECS islands. Barbados, together with Antigua, has the highest GNP per capita (6240 US dollar in 1993) among all the countries here considered.
Shocks. The adverse terms of trade shocks which characterized the beginning of the 1980s were partially compensated by favorable nonfactor service effects in 1980 and 1981. This partially reflects the fact that Barbados at the end of the 1970s was already a diversified economy based on tourism, sugar exports and a growing manufacturing sector, mainly clothing and food processing.
However, the world recession, the fall in sugar prices, the increased competition in tourism from other islands with lower prices affected real output in the first part of the decade. Only in 1986 output growth went back to the 1980 level, after being negative in 1982 and 1983 (see Table 14 ). This vulnerability to external events played a crucial role in shaping Barbados' economic fortune after 1989. Again real GDP growth turned negative in 1990 and inflation accelerated in 1991. However, the latter was already under control in 1993.
Responses. In the first period under analysis, the export expansion and import intensity measures were opposite in sign, contributing to restore balance of payments equilibrium in 1984. In the following period, 1987-92, the situation was the reverse with a decrease in imports per unit of output and export growth below the world increase. Economic compression was relevant in the two periods 1981-83
and 1990-92 in which Barbados experienced negative real output growth rates. One of the recurrent problems in the Barbados economy is associated with the loss of external competitiveness with regard to other Caribbean competitors. This was the case in both the two major crises anticipated by adverse external shocks at the beginning of both the 1980s and 1990s. The improvement in tourism competitiveness and the consequent economic recovery in the period 1986-89 is partially explained by the depreciation of the US dollar to which the exchange rate has been pegged since 1975. However, over the entire period 1980-92, Barbados' real effective exchange rate had the largest appreciation among all the countries considered in this study. Given the higher income per capita compared to the other islands Barbados cannot compete with the other islands in terms of lower wages. However, the lower cost of services and utilities in Barbados might compensate the higher labor cost component in the future.
Jamaica
Shocks. In the period 1980-92 the annual average value for terms of trade shocks was 0.6 percent of GDP but the cumulative effect of additional net external financing increased steadily so that the total shock averaged 2.6 percent of GDP. While adverse shocks in the 1970s were due primarily to the two oil shocks, in the early 1980s there was a different pattern as depressed global markets were somewhat compensated for by favorable movements in the terms of trade. Towards the end of the decade the Gulf War again had a major negative impact on Jamaica. This time it affected not only the terms of trade but also had a major depressing effect on sectors such as tourism. The adverse oil shocks in the 1970s and again in the late 1980s were supply-side shocks. Based on the experience in many of the industrial countries it is generally accepted that the appropriate response would have included higher gasoline taxes. This would help keep fiscal accounts in balance and reduce the need for external financing.
In order to maintain competitiveness one might also try to achieve a somewhat lower increase for 
Dominican Republic
Shocks. External shocks were rather low throughout the entire period under analysis.
The direct component, total shock less additional debt service, was on average 0.3 percent of GDP.
Shocks varied from the favorable fall in oil prices in the middle of the decade, which coincided with improved global market conditions for its principal commodity exports, to the precipitous rise in oil prices at the end of the decade due to the Gulf War (adverse terms of trade shock of 4 percent in 1990). Adverse impact on sugar exports was further compounded with reduction in the U.S. sugar quota. The low level of terms of trade shocks is explained by the Dominican Republic's diversified export base. Prices and production of sugar, tobacco, coffee, cocoa and ferronickel moved in different directions during the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. In addition, tourism has been a very important source of foreign exchange.
The Dominican Republic is one of the most visited tourist destinations of the Caribbean. Negative output growth in 1990 and 1991 was followed by a strong recovery in 1992 (real GDP rose by 7 percent).
Responses. The second oil shock was not accompanied by any favorable trends on commodity prices for Dominican Republic exports so that an active response was called for. Ideally this would seek to restore some of the loss in competitiveness due to the supply-side shock. However the government did not pass on the oil price increase to customers and this led to deterioration in fiscal 
Trinidad and Tobago
Shocks. Trinidad and Tobago is an oil exporter so that its fortunes were quite different from most of the rest of the Caribbean. Over the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s it had favorable external shocks which turned adverse after 1982. What is perhaps more remarkable is the volatility of these shocks. This, measured by the standard deviation, was 11 percent in the period 1980-86 and 5 percent in the period 1987-92. The most significant favorable shocks were the second oil shock (14 percent in 1980) and again the Gulf war effect in the late 1980s. On the other hand Trinidad suffered major unfavorable shocks in 1986 and in 1991 as a consequence of sharp drops in international oil prices and falling petroleum production. Mature fields were depleted and no new discoveries were made.
Nonfactor service effects were not important in Trinidad and Tobago reflecting the limited importance of tourism in this country. In 1990, after a seven-year decline, real GDP rose by 1.5 percent.
Responses. Trinidad and Tobago used the oil largesse from both oil shocks to help increase investments to close to 30 percent of GDP in 1980. Much of this was in the non-tradable goods sector leading to upward pressure on the exchange rate. It failed to take adequate measures to stabilize revenues so that when shocks turned unfavorable demand collapsed, investment shares were cut back to as low as 13 percent in 1988, and unemployment especially in the non-tradable goods sector increased
sharply. This reflected poor policy choices and engendered a general lack of confidence. Policy did not adjust quickly after the second oil bonanza in the early 1980s. The real exchange rate appreciated so that it proved extremely difficult to diversify the economy, a typical Dutch disease syndrome. Only after 1986, a series of exchange rate adjustments combined with the depreciation of the U.S. dollar against other major currencies caused a depreciation of the Trinidad and Tobago dollar.
In retrospect it is evident that it would have been more prudent to iron out some of the peaks and valleys of oil price fluctuations. This could lead to a more stable level of investment, help moderate the sharp appreciation of the real exchange rate and in turn diversify the economy and position it for sustained growth. There was some accumulation of external debt in the 1980s when the shocks became unfavorable. Some progress was achieved on infant mortality. The rate dropped from 31 in 1982 to 15 in 1992.
Summary. Trinidad and Tobago was hit by a variety of shocks that, on average, were favorable in the 1970s but unfavorable in the 1980s. These shocks were characterized by high volatility.
The policy response was to first stimulate investment and address some social factors. However failure to devise an appropriate cushioning mechanism meant that investment levels were subject to large (and inevitably undesirable) swings. The real exchange rate was allowed to appreciate significantly, thereby diminishing the chances for diversifying the economy and achieving a stable sustainable growth pattern.
The sharp rise in wealth due to the oil largesse was a typical Dutch disease phenomenon. The wealth induced increase in spending results in a resource shift towards non-tradables while non-oil exports experience a decline. When oil prices decrease the process is reversed and the non-tradable sectors decline and this results in employment shifts.
This appendix outlines the computational approach of decomposing external shocks, estimating their impacts on the current account and assessing the economy's performance response to the external shocks. The convention in this approach is that the impact of unfavorable shocks is registered as a positive value.
A. External Shocks: methodology
In this paper we consider four direct shocks and one indirect. The direct shocks are 
1) Terms of Trade Effect (TOT)
Import and export price effects are estimated separately and later combined to obtain the total terms of trade external shock TOT t . This represents the net effect of terms of trade variation at time t due to import and export price changes from time t-1 to t.
TOT t = TOTM t -TOTX t t = (1980,..,1992) where TOTM is derived as
where VM t is the volume and PM t is the unit price of the country's merchandise imports at time t. The same formula applies to the export price effect TOTX,
where VX t is the volume and PX t is the unit price of the country's merchandise exports at time t.
The combined effect of TOTM and TOTX is obtained as
which gives the terms of trade effect at year t. One limitation of this methodology is that a terms of trade deterioration may not necessarily lead to adverse impact on the balance of payments when the volume weight on export is significantly greater than the volume weight on imports.
2) Nonfactor Services Effect (NFS)
Since tourism represents a large share of the Caribbean countries' international transactions, it is important to take into consideration the nonfactor services component of the current account in the terms of trade analysis. One problem is that there is little if any country-specific information on the prices of nonfactor services. The "lesser of evils" solution here adopted consists in calculating the nonfactor services net effect using the unit price for merchandise imports for both receipts and payments.
Thus, NFS t = (NFSPU t -NFSRU t ) (PM t -PM t-1 ) t = (1980,..,1992) where NFSPU and NFSRU are the nonfactor service payments and receipts indexes 12 respectively, and PM is the unit price of the country's merchandise imports.
3) Global Demand: Export Volume Effect (EVE) 12 Where NFSPU t x PM t is equal to the nonfactor service payments in US dollars at time t and NFSRU t x PM t is equal to the nonfactor service receipts in US dollars at time t.
The global demand shock is estimated by looking at the quantity effect. The Export Volume Effect indicates that the country's share of world export is changed as a consequence of growth/slowdown in the world demand. EVE t is the value of exports by the country at time t if it is assumed that there is no change in price from time t-1 to t. Hence, EVE t = VX t-1 PX t-1 (TXVW t -GRXVW t ) t= (1980,..,1992) where TXVW t is the expected rate of growth in world export volume at time t, based on the previous ten years, and GRXVW t is the growth rate in world export from time t-1 to t.
4) Interest Rate Effect (IRF)
This measure represents the loss/gain in interest payments at time t caused by movements in the international interest rate. A positive IRF t , as determined by an increase in the international interest rate, means a worsening in the country's obligation or an unfavorable shock.
IRF t = LTVIR t-1 (i t -i t-1 ) t= (1980,..,1992) where i is the six-month LIBOR on US dollar deposits (period average), and LTVIR t-1 is the portion of a country's long-term debt at time t-1 sensitive to changes in international interest rates. It is computed by adding together the share of public and publicly guaranteed long-term debt at variable interest rate and the total private non-guaranteed debt. The latter is assumed to be interest sensitive. (See World Bank, World
Debt Tables, various years).
5) Additional Debt Service (ADSE)
Lack of adequate domestic adjustments forces a country to accumulate payment arrears and seek additional foreign borrowing to mitigate the impact of the external shocks. While this practice shifts the impact of current shocks into the future, it places further burden on the current account in the future through compounding interest liabilities. Assuming that additional net external financing at time t-1 due to the impact of all shocks at that time, net of other responses, is ANEF t-1 , and the applicable interest rate is i t , the total additional interest payments due ADSE shall be ADSE t = i t ANEF t-1
If such extraordinary borrowing is relied on for a long period, say j years, the cumulative interest impact will be This interest impact can be substantial through accumulation over time if neither performance improvements nor favorable shocks offset the unfavorable ones.
B. Performance Measures: methodology
In this analysis four measures of performance responses to external shocks are considered: 1)Export Expansion, 2) Import Intensity, 3) Economic Compression, and 4) Additional Net External Financing.
1) Export Expansion (XE)
This is a measure of the increase/decrease in a country's export share in the international market. It is computed for the merchandise component of the trade balance as follows:
XE t = VX t-1 PX t-1 (GRVE t -GRXVW t ) t= (1980,..,1992) where GRVE and GRXVW are the real export growth rates in the country and in the world. A positive export expansion measure represents a gain in the export share of the country and an improvement in its current account, assuming that prices had not changed from time t-1 to t. Vice-versa, a negative export expansion reflects relatively poor response to external shocks. This measure does not provide a direct relationship between trade policies and export performance. This caveat is particularly relevant for the small Caribbean islands. Since these countries' exports are mainly concentrated in few agricultural products, the destructive impact of the hurricanes on the islands' crops is reflected in large drops in their export volumes.
2) Import Intensity (MINT)
An economy can respond to external shocks by reducing its imports through changing its import intensity per unit of real GDP, which is generally captured in the income elasticity of imports θ. If imports did not grow in reality as in the assumed "normal" case, where a constant import intensity is kept, then the economy induced import substitution or its imports were compressed by technical difficulties such as payments problems. Assuming that no change in price from time t-1 to t had occurred, MINT t is computed as MINT t = VM t-1 PM t-1 [θ t GDPGR t -GRVM t ] t = (1980,..,1992) where GDPGR t is the real GDP growth rate and GRVM t is the real import growth rate in the country at time t.
3) Economic Compression (ECOM)
Assuming that domestic income decline induces falls in demand for foreign goods, the effect of economic compression is computed as ECOM t = VM t-1 PM t-1 [θ t (GDPT t -GDPGR t )] t = (1980,..,1992) where GDPT t is the expected trend rate, based on the previous five years, of real growth in the country's GDP at year t, and GDPGR t is the annual real GDP growth rate. With a given elasticity θ t , imports will be reduced when economic compression takes place. This in turns will affect the demand for foreign exchange.
4) Additional Net External Financing (ANEF)
The country's external balance after considering all the positive and negative responses to external shocks is filled mainly with extraordinary financing, namely additional borrowing and arrears accumulation. Here, the effect of the net additional external financing ANEF is measured as
ANEF t = [(TOT t + NFS t + EVE t + IRF t + ADSE t ) -(XE t + MINT t + ECOM t )]
where ANEF is the ex-post equilibrium measure of external financing required to compensate the difference between the total external shock and performance response measures.
